














This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Blom K. (2016) 
Imaginative Enclave in Maison de Verre.  
In: John Shannon Hendrix and Lorens Eyan Holm (eds.)  
Architecture and the Unconscious.  
Farnham: Ashgate/Routledge, pp.233-251. 
 
Copyright: 
© 2016, Routledge. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter published by Routledge in Architecture and the 
Unconscious on 28/01/2016, available online: https://www.routledge.com/products/9781472456472 
 
Date deposited:   
16/03/2016 
Embargo release date:  








This chapter discusses the relationship between spatial imagination and the unconscious in 
architecture. Spatial imagination relies on spatial perception and architecture’s concrete 
qualities, which interact with our body, our unconscious and become noted in the associative 
intimation which we have with objects around us. For Sigmund Freud the personal sensuous 
experiences (percepts) are embedded in the unconscious. Any mental image has its origin in the 
perceptual, objectual world: ‘all mental images stem from – are reproductions of – 
perceptions’.1 In his second topographical model of the unconscious Freud concentrates on the 
super-ego, ego, and the id. One form of consciousness, consciousness of percepts, is associated 
with the skin and other sense organs. The skin mediates between the sensations of internal and 
external impulses. According to Freud memories do not surface into consciousness non-altered, 
rather they surface in a converted manner in the shape of preconscious mental images, dreams 
or other distorted sensuous data of which we were once conscious and now become again 
aware.  
The reproduction of a perception as a mental image is not always a faithful 
copy; it can be modified by omissions or by fusion of various elements.2 
Personal experiences are vital to discharge the enormous energy which lies in our unconscious. 
Experience happens at the bodily level; it does not happen in our minds, but in our embodied 
minds. ‘Embodied mind’ is a phenomenological concept which is used for instance by Shaun 
Gallagher to describe the fusion of the personal and sensual (preneotic) unknown mechanism of 
the body.3 
Similarly James Gibson argues for an ecological approach to visual perception. He 
asserts that the human body reads environmental phenomena either as negative or positive 
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affordances, and this reading is automated, it does not need our conscious consent.4 Objects 
invite us to do something or we feel the need to detach ourselves from them (withdraw, run 
away, turn around). In this respect the body is assumed to have functions of which we are not 
aware. Architects influence whether buildings are read as habitable (positive affordance) or 
non-habitable (negative affordance). The filtering and evaluative process of the unknown is a 
constant in architectural experience; sometimes these evaluations cause our body to reject a 
place, sometimes to feel relief when residing. 
We could ask what qualities in architecture trigger mental images to surface. Because 
this is a relation between object and subject, it has a special concrete acuteness and particularity 
to it. Gaston Bachelard’s poetic image is a specific materially based on the mental image, 
which does not rely on our memories but our body’s muscular relation to the object or space 
which reverberates in us. Bachelard thinks these images are functions of the intimate sense 
(sens intime).5  
This sens intime is a concept for which I do not find a definition in Bachelard. 
According to the translators of The Imagination by Jean-Paul Sartre, Kenneth Williford and 
David Rudrauf, the term had been used by Pierre-Françoise Maine de Biran, and it does not 
refer to ‘inner sense’ but ‘denotes the immediate self-knowledge of consciousness that grounds 
our explicit reflective knowledge and cannot be identified with or reduced to the knowledge 
acquired from sensory organs’.6 I am attracted to it because of its vagueness. When ‘intimation’ 
is used in social life it means to imply, hint; it refers to the hidden (unknown, or almost known, 
as in preconscious daydreams or mental images) and to the one who is aware of the hidden and 
wants to share it with someone else. Intimation in this sense is sufficient to trigger imagination 
because its minimal oblique expression requires more or less conscious interpretation to 
become fully revealed, hence its connotation of the political unconscious. I find this notion 
appealing. According to Jonathan Webber, who translated The Imaginary by Jean-Paul Sartre, 
this term ‘the connotation of ‘intimate’ should be borne in mind. Sartre means to indicate our 
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awareness of what is closest to us’.7  The rareness and the fleeting smallness of this term 
attracts. The same applies to Bachelard’s poetic images; they are oblique and withdrawing at 
the same time as they emanate an aura of synaesthesia compatible to vivid experiences of 
architecture. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his commentary on Sartre’s The Imagination, uses the sens 
intime in the first paragraph when he summarises the difficulties of integrating the image into 
our mental faculties. He sketches the scenario that Sartre, like Hume, Descartes and Leibniz, 
have each returned to the question of the relation between the thought and image, the common 
denominator being that image is a revived perception. Nevertheless, no psychology so far has 
disputed the existence of the image.  
As a modification of thought or a received impression, [the image] is a real 
part of the thinking being. In a word, it is a thing within. Experimental 
psychology will never challenge that conception. It will never confront it 
with the data of the intimate sense (sens intime).8 
To have intimate knowledge of an environment is to gain and renew it at any moment, but more 
specifically, in some specific moments of inner turmoil or enjoyment of which we become 
aware. Architectural intimation also has a hint of the gestures we find in the environment, its 
provocations or silent suggestions in the form of ‘affordances’ or ‘kinaesthetic gestures’ or 
‘figures’ which ‘reverberate’ in us. On the other hand, we also bring to the environment our 
own hidden passions, emerging affective dispositions, and motile intuitions. We visit and 
inhabit places, only to return to or reject them in our real life, or in our daydreams or dreams, 
due to their significance to us. 
Consequently, instead of the word ‘spatial image’ I am arguing for the notion of 
‘architectural intimation’, which is an event in between and in connection with the mind and 
the body, in the shared thin or limited Freudian surface or ‘skin’. Architectural intimations 
cannot be reduced to sensations, because our intense personal relations project toward external 
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real buildings and evocative objects, and consequently reflect certain qualities, strange objects, 
and partial objects of the environment. 
The Maison de Verre 
To exemplify the complexity of spatial images as architectural intimation, I take the case of 
imaginative enclave implied by Kenneth Frampton when he writes about the Maison de Verre, 
Paris (1928–32) by Pierre Chareau. In spring 2014, I wanted to read something about the house 
before visiting it in order to test the idea of preconceptions and refutations, as this was the 
theme for an intimate meeting of the Architecture’s Unconscious Network in Paris. I read texts 
about the Maison de Verre in order to imagine the spaces emerging from the text. When I then 
visited the ‘real’ Maison de Verre I could reflect upon my preconceptions while seeing it in the 
flesh. 
According to Kenneth Frampton the Maison de Verre is a project about furnishing 
rather than spatial design.9 This remark by Frampton, which is noted by Sarah Wigglesworth10 
as being dismissive of Pierre Chareau’s talent as an architect, could be an expression of the 
puzzlement of Frampton toward the incremental and delicate interior which transcends 
anything a standard design practice would provide. I interpret Frampton to mean that this 
building is like furniture in the context of the site. The steel frame structure was erected but no 
working drawings existed, as Chareau and his client Mrs Dalsace worked using models to make 
communication easier. This spontaneous practice is like an artistic installation. 
This intuitive design process of Chareau exemplifies how architectural processes work 
like an unconscious matrix, which allows us to do certain things, but not others. We are not 
fully in control of the process. The specific locality of this particularity encases it in the 
influence of the old building and its occupancy of the attic, as the prehistory or pathological 
circumstance we cannot fully know, but the consequences of which we meet in the Maison de 
Verre. 
Text as Inspiration 
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Reading Frampton’s article, my thoughts started to revolve around several puzzles, all 
indicating lighting conditions. Among the notes about Pierre Chareau’s masterpiece, I stopped 
for a while at the paragraph about the glass brick walls. When imagining the effect of the 
famous luminous façade, I realised that one can discriminate between various different ‘seeing-
light’ conditions in architecture. Architecture is experienced in the continuum of 
daylight/twilight/darkness. 
The liminal case, where light-discrimination has a crucial role in spatial imaging, is the 
phase of twilight. At the Maison de Verre, the peculiar in-between phase of reduced 
illumination became an interest of mine: mainly a diffuse light, as in viewing outdoors when 
indoors. The instances of twilight and other in-between illumination phases are enhanced, I 
argue, by spatial imagination. I argue that the condition of seeing-as – in other words noticing 
the imaginative elements – interferes with the physiological act of sensing, thus making these 
moments in space more memorable. In these peculiar moments, intimations interfere with the 
normally unconscious way we live as bodies in space. 
The Light Arrangement on the Stage of the Maison de Verre 
I come from a functionalist view of light in architecture, and initially I was unwilling to dwell 
in these complex in-between luminous instances. The lighting conditions can be interpreted 
from a practical point of view: when designing, we engage with the variations of the shadows 
according to the angle of sunlight falling on objects. On the surface, this functionalist view 
dictated the design of Chareau’s masterpiece. In the quarters demolished in order to construct 
what became the Maison de Verre, the lighting conditions were dark indeed, and consequently 
a lot of light was desired, to flush away the memory of the past darkness. The light on the three 
new floors, underneath the floor left untouched, was crucial to its new function as a doctor’s 
practice and for the social life of the lady of the house. One could not use skylights to 
illuminate the floors below. The answer was to use glass bricks on the façades. Also, other 
manufactured building parts were used, such as train windows at the rear and the steel columns. 
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Frampton states ‘The original two floors had been so dark that the employees of the asinine old 
lady, who would live to be 100, were compelled to do their work during the day by artificial 
light’.11 Frampton condenses two interesting cues here – attention is first given to the miserable 
light conditions of the old building. The second part of the jigsaw is the old lady who remained 
living on the second floor which made it impossible to demolish the old structure entirely. 
What Frampton calls ‘asininity’ is a combination of her old age and the prevailing dark 
conditions on the floors below her. This forced the designer to work around the obstacle of the 
second floor, which had to stay as it was. The narrative of the Maison de Verre has its mythical 
as well as ‘rational’ sides to it, adding to the surreal atmosphere which surrounds this place. We 
will leave the lady for a while and continue to uncover the functional reasons for Chareau’s 
lighting manoeuvres. 
When Frampton’s text continues things start to look more puzzling than my rationalist 
view allowed – the text and my imagination guided me into a building which I had never 
visited before. He mentions the glass brick wall with ‘translucent Nevada lenses’ which 
diffuses the light and makes one experience the condition of the outdoors when indoors, 
intensified by the fact that the ‘real’ outdoors is invisible, when in the living room.  
This light diffusion simulates a quality of illumination comparable to that 
experienced in the open air, thus contributing to the experience of the house 
as a ‘world within the world’, enclosing its own hierarchy of public and 
private spaces (emphasis mine).12  
Frampton’s text continues to analyse the house’s different grids and elementary spatial and 
furniture constellations; that obviously being his ‘world within the world’. 
The text acts as a trap for the spatial imagination. In what ways are the diffused light 
conditions outdoors and indoors comparable? To which grades of seeing-as does he refer? As-
outdoors, or as-if-outdoors? Or only partially the same: almost-as-outdoors? In which capacity 
then could the indoors be as the outdoors? The only thing for sure is the fact that there is no 
visual connection to the outdoors, and that makes this enclosure prone to the imagination, 
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which – to borrow Frampton’s words – is another kind of ‘world within the world’, i.e. an 
imaginative enclave, more like a claustrophobic cell than breathing or bathing in light. It is 
truly a mise-en-scène of the eradication of darkness. The actual description, and indeed also my 
experience once in the Maison de Verre, suggests that the light, which illuminates the reception 
room, is diffuse and disorientating, even nauseous. The light is not diffuse in a flickering 
manner but rather ambient or homogeneous. This condition may have been different earlier, as 
the original ‘Nevada bricks’ have a more textured and uneven colour finish. 
According to Mary Vaughan Johnson, many visitors feel claustrophobic in the 
reception hall (Architecture’s Unconscious Network second meeting, 9 May 2014). This is 
because of the effect of the glass bricks. First, the screen dominates, as its area is the same as 
that of the floor. Second, the diffuse light condition is a very particular one. The light, when 
diffused, is like that of a cloudy day, where the endless muted reflections of the sun’s rays 
through the clouds make the environment shadowless. The illumination is not full of 
scintillation but damped. The glow of the diffuse reflective light is similar to that on the street 
in the seventh arrondissement. 
It is possible to experience very similar conditions in a forest or jungle where the 
source of the light is undefined. According to old photographs, Mme Dalsace had large plants 
inside, just behind the glass brick wall, and that may have enhanced the idea of being as-if-
outside when being entertained in the living room. Similarly, the light conditions in dreams 
possess the quality of an undefined light source, similar to the morning shimmer just before the 
sun actually rises. These conditions are all exceptional, short lived, or imaginary. They are 
liminal experiences which heighten the intensity of absorption in the sensory system. 
In order to induce make-believe, the owners lit the ‘floodlights’ in front of the garden 
and front façades in the evening to prolong this condition. The floodlights are more powerful 
than any of the lights used inside, and the glass bricks reflect back some of the light from the 
floodlights so that the façade’s surface is effectively a translucent skin. Frampton, continuing 
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the sentence cited above implying the imaginative, ‘as-outdoors’, enclave of the Maison de 
Verre, states, ‘This condition is maintained at night, when the interior of the house is again 
illuminated by light diffusing through its glass from the flood-lights mounted off the forecourt 
and garden facades’.13 This text reinforces the conjecture that once you are in, you are in the 
phenomenal ‘outdoors’, without temporal interruption, without seasonal or nocturnal cessation 
which normally is experienced when ‘in the open air’. The delicate condition of sensing the 
descending and diminishing daylight is replaced by eternal in-between-ness. The conscious 
image or setting of the outdoors, is rendered atmospherically stable but its effect is surreal and 
unsettling. The impossible task of capturing and keeping safe the passing light is felt in the 
hugeness of the living room and its symmetrical cubistic void which illuminates the cultured 
objects of the owners with a mystical inner glow (Figure 13.1). Artificiality is part of its lure 
and enigmatic attraction. 
 
[Insert Figure 13.1 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.1 The reception hall. In Kenneth Frampton, ‘Maison de Verre’, Arena, The 
Architectural Association Journal, 81(901) (1966), p. 262. The Architectural Association, 
Éditions du Salon des Arts Ménagers. À hauteur de la reproduction: Les Arts Décoratifs, Paris / 
Musée des Arts Décoratifs. Dans la rubrique crédit photographique: photo distr. Les Arts 
Décoratifs, Paris. 
 
The Stage as Unstable Imaginative Enclave in Diffuse Light 
Certainly, the reasons for the use of these glass bricks are complex; one of them being the need 
for privacy for both the clients of Dr Dalsace and the visitors in Mme Dalsace’s salon. 
Furthermore, the social niche of the inhabitants and their guests or clients is physically present 
in the exclusiveness of the huge imposing front façade, not ever found before. The 
psychological need for a social enclave or difference may be seen in the urge for the modern, 
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avant-garde. The knowledge of this peculiar house’s role in the life of high-class ladies or 
cultural personalities is, of course, part of the informed visitors’ aesthetic appreciation; at the 
same time it covers this house with an overstated sense of social exclusion. The Maison de 
Verre operates as a hostile fortress, or a confrontational ‘object’. 
What I imagined when reading the text is that once you are in this building, it enclaves 
you within a certain local atmosphere. It is due to the glowing paraphernalia. The objects and 
the rubber floor become thinner in the prevailing artificiality. Instead, twilight gains 
materiality: its quasi-objective character is explained by Gernot Böhme when he studies the 
atmospheric qualities of twilight: ‘Furthermore, the twilight has a character of a something, 
almost something which counters us’.14 According to Böhme, what is remarkable about twilight 
is that once noted it has a certain thingness about it, hence it becomes quasi-objective. You can 
understand quasi-objective in two ways – either it is a thing we encounter outside ourselves that 
is other to us, or it is about the diffuse light as concrete volume.15  It is the unconscious 
becoming pre-conscious in the sensing of the space. The quasi-stuff of the never-ending 
twilight and consequential artificiality resides over the furniture and planes of the living room.16 
The diffuse illumination circumstance is, in effect, darkness-in-waiting, and the ghostly images 
or mirages start to overcome the reality; the architectural intimation becomes eerie.  
Let us continue with Böhme’s phenomenology. Further, in ‘Das Atmosphärische der 
Dämmerung’, Böhme notes that the twilight is sensed before it is perceived, and we 
automatically change our mannerisms. Like darkness, so twilight is a limiting factor, not 
because we choose this but because we are affected by the miniscule changes in sensual input. 
Unconscious bodily nerve impulses seep into our mindset, saturating it with intuitions of rest or 
the cessation of daily activities. Encountering the twilight means noticing not only it, but also 
the changes it makes in social and natural life. 
Seeing-as: The Magic of Spatial Theatre 
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On the day when I visited the Maison de Verre, one remarkable encounter happened, which 
made me think of the French National Library and W.G. Sebald’s image of it as an ocean-
liner.17 The stairs from the ground floor leaving the reception hall have no handrails. They are 
quite wide, and the partial walls are further away. When ascending you have to look down to 
your feet, and the stairs reveal their structure, which is not bolted, but rests on hooks. You are 
elevated from the ground level and you ascend into a different world altogether. The feeling of 
voyage or travelling on sea is emphasised by some window features reminding you of industrial 
origins. Kinaesthetically, when entering the living room, the guest is boarding a ship, not the 
home of Mrs Dalsace. 
The disappearance of the interior which is replaced by a make-believe outdoors or 
ocean ship deck is part of the operation of re-figuring or relocating the outdoors, reinforcing 
one’s unsettling location. Are we in a phenomenal outdoors? Or somewhere in imaginative 
space? Before I can answer the question, let me point out a parallel case. 
 
[Insert Figure 13.2 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.2 Fujiko Nakaya, Veil (2014), in Philip Johnson’s Glass House (1949). Courtesy of 
Richard Barnes 2013. 
 
When you enter Philip Johnson’s Glass House (1949), the interior seems to disappear – 
it seems to become empty, while you are perceptually transported outwards. In normal 
situations, being inside the house means that one may be drawn visually outside. This 
translocation was made apparent when fog was introduced in 2014 by artist Fujiko Nakaya in 
an installation on the premises (Figure 13.2). The temporal circumstances might have locked 
the spectator inside the house when transparent glass suddenly became opaque. Inside the glass 
box which is circumscribed by the fog the spectator realises the existence of the indoors, which 
enclaves him, similarly to the Maison de Verre. Are you here, but amidst the fog also in the 
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imagined outdoors? The light conditions may be similar, and you are not only connected to the 
outdoors visually: this must be a make-believe enclave of the outdoors. The imaginative 
enclave is unstable and free in its interpretations. The unconscious seeps into the real concrete 
world. In constant checking of the outdoor-indoor constellation you are in an intimate 
relationship with architecture. This is an intimation which has more seen-as than as-if qualities, 
because the connections between the outdoors and indoors are severed (Figure 13.3). 
 
[Insert Figure 13.3 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.3 Enclave in fog of Philip Johnson Glass House. Courtesy of Kati Blom 2015. 
 
Phenomenal Episode 
‘Inattentional blindness’ is a condition where the subject fails to notice a fully visible but 
unexpected object because her attention has been engaged by another object. The word 
describes a normal condition, which makes one’s brain discard information one is not focussed 
on for the moment. In the recent exhibition Inattentional Blindness (2014) in Galeri Zilberman, 
Turkey, Liddy Scheffknecht presented a work ‘Crop’ where the shadow from the window 
display could be misread as a shadow of a plant (Figure 13.4). The shadow is wrongly read as 
attached to the plant which acts as if it were an obstacle in between the sun and the floor. The 
‘real’ shadow is in its normal position on the other side of the pot. The blurred, ‘real’ shadow 
and the sharp, ‘surreal’ shadow co-exist. As such, there is nothing alarming in this because it 
represents the usual state of affairs where there are many light sources present. But the 
existence of the non-rational in this topological puzzle is made clear when you see the white 
‘shadow’ on the glass pane. The irrational link is established – the virtual enclave created. The 
surreal condition creates a subspace where the enigmatic conditions prevail, and even if we 
understand that we have erred, it is hard not to notice the surreal. To realise the error one must 
pause and solve the puzzle consciously. In the unconscious there are, according to Freud, no 
1 
 
negations or contradictions, but when we start to verbalise these preconscious ‘impossibilities’, 
the negation (Verneinung) marks the presence of the unconscious – we must halt to pay 
attention.18 This also shows the blindness of the unconscious to causality. In such an instance, 
the artwork becomes a miracle. 
 
[Insert Figure 13.4 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.4 Liddy Scheffknecht, CROP, 2013. Lambda print, 100 × 130 cm, Inattentional 
Blindness, 10 January–22 February 2014, Galeri Zilberman, Beyoğlu/Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Vivian Mizrahi, in a recent symposium about shadows, images and transparencies, 
claimed that air, glass, water and mirrors are all mediating substances. She observes that the 
glass pane of the window, which causes the sharp shadow, goes unnoticed. We are not sure of 
the ontological status of the white figure – it could be yet another shadow caused by the 
mystical redirection of the sun’s rays hanging in the air like a ghost or phantom. We can 
understand the transmission of the rays via glass only rationally, for the glass-sun link is not 
concretely present. It is certain that glass’s subliminality or non-phenomenality contributes to 
the increased sense of the surreal in the cast shadow. Similarly, the glass bricks of the Maison 
de Verre do not phenomenally contribute to the twilight which remains unexplained. 
Consequently, also the glass bricks become enigmatic. The surreal is, according to Merleau-
Ponty, the attachment we have to objects in their infancy, in pre-perceptive directness. He 
refers to André Breton’s view on objects of desire, in vertiginous proximity.19 
Objects of Desire or Repulsion 
In the Maison de Verre, the supporting columns are ‘odd objects’ of which we become aware in 
the diffuse light. The old photo (Figure 13.1) shows clearly how the industrial pillars stand out 
among the bourgeois comforts. The columns are a structural necessity but their position in plan 
appears random. Before visiting the Maison de Verre, I found myself intrigued by the 
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immaculate minute design, where some elements in the drawings are incomprehensible. I could 
not, for instance, understand the meaning of the columns which are present in the drawing 
(Figure 13.5), but I felt no trace of them in the interior photo credited to Éditions du Salon des 
Arts Ménagers (Figure 13.6). Things did not align. These absurd permutations may have 
resulted either from the hidden and open function of the structure but also from the associative 
dialogue between Mrs Dalsace and Pierre Chareau. 
 
[Insert Figure 13.5 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.5 Oddly located columns which do not coincide with anything in the hall. Courtesy 
of Kati Blom 2015. 
[Insert Figure 13.6 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.6 The living room: no signs of the columns identified in the plans. One particular 
column disappeared (the one on the right, close to the bookshelves). In Kenneth Frampton, 
‘Maison de Verre’, Arena, The Architectural Association Journal, 81(901) (1966), p. 261. 
Courtesy of Michael Carapetian 1966. 
 
In my aesthetic consideration, I take into account the facts of which I am aware. 
Relating back to the old asinine lady and the darkness of the living quarters, the persistence of 
the condition remains in the unstable image of the prolonged twilight or diffuse light condition. 
The presence of the not-belonging parts (columns, glass bricks and the repeated encounter with 
them elsewhere in the house) work as the white shadow in Liddy Scheffknecht’s artwork – they 
are not integrated into the experience and thus interrogate the stable nature of the concrete 
architectural configuration. Their irrationality invites other images or poetic explanations to 
enter; Bachelard’s singular material imaginings take place. The ghost of the lady is everywhere, 
in the luminous façade and in the way glass bricks are used inside close to the doctor’s surgery. 
Her existence is not private, for it is very concretely part of the house. The Maison de Verre 
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probes the darkness and twilight, the origin of which is located in the repository of the former 
second floor.  
This is repeated and recreated in the unconscious of the architectural pilgrims who take 
photographs and always try to frame the picture to include only the new façade, and eliminate 
the attic as non-existent. Even for me, it took a while to realise the upper area did exist, 
although I had seen several hundred pictures of the house, both professional and amateur. The 
sections or plans suppress the upper floor, and Frampton’s second visit as described in his 
article ‘Maison de Verre’ (1969) is no exception, by framing out the unnecessary relic (Figure 
13.8). In contrast, Frampton’s cross-section from 1966 shows boldly the empty, ghostly upper 
residence (Figure 13.7). 
 
[Insert Figure 13.7 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.7 Cross-section. In Kenneth Frampton, ‘Maison de Verre’, Arena, The Architectural 
Association Journal, 81(901) (1966), p. 258. Kenneth Frampton 1966. 
[Insert Figure 13.8 here – landscape] 
Figure 13.8 Cross-section. ‘Maison de Verre’, Perspecta, 12 (1969), p. 91. Kenneth Frampton 
1969. 
 
The mixture of my preconceptions in the form of the images was reinforced by other 
unsettling objects in the actual building. The real encounter with the glass house is a mixture of 
different thoughts, memories, images, allusions and prenominal acts. All these mental and 
visceral elements contribute to the whole house to become an intimation as the stairs, 
cupboards and glass walls rise up to remind the visitor of the magic initiated. It is not only the 
details which invigorate us; we agree that the building itself is vibrating (Figure 13.9). 
 
[Insert Figure 13.9 here – portrait] 
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Figure 13.9 ‘Forecourt night view of house, illuminated both internally and externally’. The 
blackness of the attic is another noticeable feature. ‘Maison de Verre’, Perspecta, 12 (1969), p. 
93. Michael Carapetian 1969. 
 
The image of the Maison de Verre is a configuration of things we already know or have 
experienced, or can imagine from Frampton’s texts. This architectural intimation is a fragile 
conglomeration of both percepts and imagined entities. According to Edmund Husserl, the 
imagined entity (image) is embedded in the perception: the perceptual conflict assures we are 
dealing with a mental image. (What is it? An image or an object?)20 For Gaston Bachelard the 
material imagination is a creative process initiated by conflicts.21 The unconscious, according to 
Freud, is an accumulation of perceptions (sensual input) either repressed or not: there is no 
mental image (presentation, i.e. Vorstellung) which has not been once a percept.22  
One similar description can be found in Sartre’s The Imaginary. A female actor, 
Françonay, mimics Maurice Chevalier (1888–1972); as the spectators know, it is a woman 
giving the impression of the famous male comedian and singer.23  With a straw hat tilted 
diagonally over her head, the reality of a woman is changed to the illusion of a man not present. 
The image to which we agree is attended by a strong feeling of the presence of Chevalier. 
There is a conscious shift from the real woman to the impression of Chevalier. The 
physiognomy of ‘Chevalier’ affects one’s body at the same time as one is conscious of the 
contradiction. Sartre asserts that the two realities, the real woman and the memory of Chevalier, 
are synthesised, and thus give a certain joyfulness and depth to the experience of the imitator’s 
performance. ‘This is ultimately because only a formal will can prevent consciousness from 
slipping from the level of the image to that of the perception’.24 Percepts and illusions co-exist 
or are very close to each other. Husserl notes this closeness of phantasy and perceptions, and 
ponders about different possibilities of one phenomenon existing in either of the worlds; thus, 
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some phenomena would be in the process of ‘becoming’ to exist in either of the realms, in an 
in-between zone. 25 
It is up to the observer to maintain the illusion of a man instead of the reality of a 
woman. The state is not that of the equilibrium. It is a very fragile intimation alternating 
between reality and imagination. The Maison de Verre has a simultaneous double life. We feel 
that the pretension in the setting reveals something, which is hard to maintain except by will. 
And the imagination adds to this physicality, infused by the sustained outdoor lighting, some 
precise artificiality and haunting beauty. 
Imaginative Enclave is an Enclosure Imagining Connections 
In the case of the Maison de Verre, the space is really a place. Hence it is a limited, Aristotelian 
enclosure. The glass brick wall and especially the surfaces, a luminous miracle, comprise the 
borders of the sensuous locality. All surfaces in the living room, as the screen of the Maison de 
Verre suggests, are impenetrable vertical surfaces with some notion of penetrable partitions. 
The visual connections are terminated; there is no way of any substantial sensuous testimony of 
the reality of outside. The only thing reminding me of the existence of the reality is diffuse 
light. The persistence of the otherwise short-lived twilight is disturbing and contributes to the 
realisation of the increasing artificiality of the space. The real vertical walls are mysteriously 
torn apart when the visitor starts to imagine the outdoors, trying to make sense of the peculiar 
stage, doing away with the real verticals to reinforce the fictional as-if image of the outdoors; 
getting to grips with the material reality which is vanishing in front of the observer is an 
example of vertiginous proximity, as Merleau-Ponty notes. So the connections in this enclave 
are imaginative, not real. 
Scintillation and Architecture: Contrasts in Sensing Brightness 
Let us return to the focus of my interest in Frampton’s 1966 article about the Maison de Verre, 
the illumination. Frampton assumes that the glass brick façade was used to create a light 
condition inside the house compatible to that outside. He especially mentions the diffuse light, 
1 
 
which is prolonged in the evenings by light fixtures located outside the façades. Before visiting 
the house, I investigated the photos to detect the diffuse light conditions, which had been 
referred to in the text. 
The photo (Figure 13.6) reveals a peculiar artificiality, as the living room is 
photographed from a spot in the balcony close to the façade, facing towards the objects, 
furniture and the surfaces, which are bathed in this indirect, shadowless light. Why is this so 
peculiar that it further animates me, and later even causes nausea? One explanation is that what 
I imagine does not correspond to anything I can express verbally, even if it was influenced by 
Frampton’s text. I wanted to see what the text implies, because the text itself was full of 
fictional or poetic imagery (old asinine lady, her 100 years of life, darkness of the previous 
living quarters, etc.), which revives an oneiric presence.  
I have one line of inquiry in order to study further the dullness or dead quality of the 
light in the photo. It is obviously important to eliminate direct sunlight, but consequently this 
setting dampened the possible glittering or iridescence, and consequently, even if not 
intentionally, minimised the variations of lustre in the interior of the Maison de Verre. The 
lustre of the surfaces is a key to this growing uneasiness due to the diffuse light. 
The nature of the surface has deeper significance to our visual perception than the form 
or shape of an object. According to James Gibson, surfaces are detected by human sight with 
absolute and astonishing accuracy; we are able to distinguish the texture, viscosity, reflectivity, 
density or edibility of the things around us, to the extent that Gibson denies that the human 
visual system is capable of ‘seeing’ depth or three-dimensionality space.26 The information we 
gain is dependent on the sensed stimulus but also on the grade of illumination, as homogeneous 
ambient brightness and darkness may fail to stimulate sight receptors, and consequently no 
information is available to the visual system.27 The percept is then that of ‘nothingness’ if the 
condition prevails.28 The dullness or lifeless appearances of things are unconsciously noted, and 
without doubt the glossiness or iridescence; and the possibility of observing them is an 
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important psychological factor. Lack of direct sunlight makes the observation of the grade of 
brightness of things more difficult. 
In architecture, the shadow or lack of shadow is of interest, for it has an impact on the 
way we perceive space. Consequently, the dullness of diffuse light in the Maison de Verre 
eliminates sharp shadows and direct sunlight, and contributes to the ghostly artificiality of the 
setting. The glimmer or flickering translucency is minimised, as noted earlier in this chapter, 
due to the newer, more perfect glass bricks. Even if the earlier ones also eliminated the sharpest 
differences, they seemed to maintain some of the flickering quality of the light coming through 
the foliage, for instance. The light entropy contributes to the claustrophobic or unsettling 
impact that the Maison de Verre’s light condition has on some visitors.  
Finnish architect Juha Leiviskä for instance notes how sharp corners, and accordingly 
sharp shadows, are important in architecture, as round corners or curved walls eliminate the 
shadow and the spatial clarity is lost.29 He does not approve of the concave walls in Reima 
Pietilä’s Student Union Building (1966) of the Dipoli Conference Centre on the Otamiemi 
Campus of Aalto University in Espoo, Finland. In contrast, Juhani Pallasmaa muses 
enthusiastically about the chiaroscuro of Alvar Aalto’s round walls:  
The emotive impact of light is highly intensified when it is perceived as an 
imaginary substance. Alvar Aalto’s lighting arrangements frequently reflect 
light from a curved white surface and the chiaroscuro of the rounded surfaces 
give light an experiential plasticity, materiality, and heightened presence.30 
Juha Leiviskä’s designs create a different, optically vibrant spatial experience, where the planes 
are cut precisely to punctuate the space, which then radiates and results in an undulating light 
condition, a bit like in the play of light in water, never still, rather scattered rhythmically. The 
sharp corners are in contrast with shimmering white planes giving the rooms a distinct 
spatiality. 31  In the Finnish language there is a word for ‘water glimmer’, a short-lived 
vedenvälke. For me the presence of life in the form of glittering or vibration is an important 
quality in the environment. It has been said that in Nordic architecture, the light has a central 
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role, and possibly this is due to the sensitiveness to radiance or ‘coldness-incandescence’ in 
snow and ice. Nordic people can tell when the ice no longer supports them by its radiance. This 
is due to decreased glossiness, which in turn is caused by the consistency of ice becoming more 
liquid. Radiance changes in all living things. We can unconsciously know the presence or 
absence of living energy. 
Discussion 
In the architectural intimation we fuse previous knowledge or memories with the acuteness of 
the concrete object-world in order to create a personal, subjective relationship with an 
environment. The surreality is triggered in the intimation if the real qualities are substituted by 
mental images surfacing mainly from our unconscious. These preconscious surreal images are 
in conflict with our day-time consciousness, causing doubt or hesitation, even nausea in the 
environmental experience. 
Psychoanalyst and author Christopher Bollas describes well how the everyday 
environment becomes part of our daily associative thinking. Each evocative object resonates in 
us in a particular way, either causing attachment and enjoyment, or dejection. As in Freud’s 
dream work where free association and creative imagining are crucial, orientating ourselves in 
a human environment can liberate our kinaesthetic and emotive being, and create new 
connections and amplify spatial intimations. 
According to Bollas, monumental buildings symbolise patriarchal stiffness, and some 
of them may be created as ‘archi-excrement’ by architects. Consequently, the public 
experiences them as offensive.32 Buildings, when they are designed as identifiable monuments, 
evoke memories or mental images similar to other evocative, smaller objects.33 More precisely, 
this term ‘evocative object’ refers to inner associations: ‘The term ‘evocative object’ was used 
in psychology to refer to the self’s capacity to evoke an internal mental representation of the 
object’.34 In the Maison de Verre, the ambiguous columns and glass bricks in the square outer 
wall were evocative objects to me. The vague disposition of the columns in the photo and their 
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disappearance in the actual nauseating diffuse light conditions, present in the photo, made 
certain other associations surface from my unconscious. 
Such an object in this sense may not always revive good memories, or even any mental 
images which linger in the preconscious. The significance of ‘ugly buildings’ or revolting 
objects is also to discharge some unconscious energy to dejection (melancholia); the attitude or 
pose towards this particular building or object may not ever change, or may change during 
one’s lifetime.35 The most important factor that contributed to the emergence of the fragile 
paradoxical architectural image was the diffuse and dampening light conditions which I could 
sense in the old black and white interior photos, and also when I visited the house. Absence of 
iridescence and oscillating natural light intensified the artificiality of the interior and made the 
twilight itself quasi-objective and surreal, enclosing me rather than connecting me to the world 
outside. 
In the case study of the imaginative enclave caused by the Maison de Verre, I have also 
pointed out that the architectural processes themselves can be seen to reflect unconscious acts 
from our side (the way we photograph or redraw this particular building without its attic, or the 
way we design buildings in an ad hoc manner). Also the prehistory of any building, like the 
partly demolished ancestor of the Maison de Verre, can haunt the existing building. The 
Maison de Verre’s specific made-up construction is a phantom of a specific trauma of not being 
able to reject the dependency of the earlier occupancy. I have explained how this prehistory is 
felt at a personal level, during a fleeting architectural intimation.  
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